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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Recent philosophical accounts of gender identity have defined the concept in terms of an individual’s 
internal psychological features.. Two popular examples of this are Katharine Jenkins’s and Jennifer 
McKittrick’s recent accounts. Jenkins defines gender identity in terms of a person’s experiences of 
gender norm-relevancy. On her view, one’s gender identity is a kind of ‘internal map’ that guides one 
through various gender-norms constitutive of gender as a social class (Jenkins 2018, 2016). 
McKittrick’s view, on the other hand, defines gender identity in terms of gender-coded behavioral 
dispositions. On her view, a person’s gender identity is determined by a set of sufficiently many, 
sufficiently strong dispositions to behave in gender-coded ways (McKitrick 2015). 
 Both of these views are undoubtedly important for understanding lived experiences of gender, 
but they suffer from two problems: a diversity problem and a resource problem.  
 First, these accounts suffer from a diversity problem: it is unclear how these views can account 
for the diverse range of gender identities possible within queer and trans-inclusive contexts. On both 
Jenkins’s and McKittrick’s views, gender terms like ‘non-binary’ and ‘woman’ name two incompatible 
psychological phenomena. So, how could these views account for an agent using both of these terms 
to describe their gender identity? This example isn’t just a conceptual possibility: many people who 
identify as non-binary also identify as men or women (see §2 below). It is at least difficult for the recent 
views to account for the possibility of these gender identities by appealing to differences between 
psychological types (or in Jenkins’s terms, differences between ‘internal gender maps’). And this 
difficulty is especially concerning because an adequate philosophical understanding of the concept of 
gender identity should be consistent with LGBTQ+ people’s understanding of the same concept.1 
 
1 Versions of the diversity problem have been raised before in response to Jenkins’s and McKitrick’s definitions, 
though not under this label. See Andler’s criticism that norm-relevancy mis-categorizes trans men and women 
who experience their bodies trans-normatively (2017); Barnes’s criticism that an emphasis on gender identity 
problematically excludes cognitively disabled woman from the category ‘woman’ (forthcoming: 7-8); and 
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 Second, these accounts suffer from a practical resource problem: a solely psychological view of 
gender identity is ill-equipped for helping trans citizens secure important social or material resources 
that they often need. To take just one example, binary trans citizens seeking legal recognition of their 
gender identity in the U.K. must present the state with a medical diagnoses of gender dysphoria, as 
well as documentation that “proves that they have been living as their desired gender for at least two 
years” (U.K. Gov’t: 30).2 Evidential requirements like these severely undermine the agency that trans 
people ought to have over their own gender categorizations, and these requirements are made possible 
by a solely psychological understanding of the concept of gender identity — experiences of gender-
norm relevancy must be demonstrated to the state with a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and 
dispositions to behave in certain gender-coded ways must be made manifest with qualifying 
documentation. A philosophical account of gender identity should help trans groups resist rather than 
reinforce the dominant conceptual schemas of gender that serve as barriers to important social 
resources. 
I think that the diversity and resource problems can be addressed, in part, by paying closer 
attention to the conceptual resources that trans and queer people use to understand themselves.3 Here, 
I argue that we should endorse a distinction between gender orientation — a name for the psychological 
phenomena discussed in the recent literature — and gender identity — an agent’s sincerely self-ascribed 
gender categorization(s), which is often aimed at revising their social position(s). 
 
Dembroff’s criticism that ‘internalist’ views of gender are inadequate as accounts of critical gender categories 
like ‘genderqueer’ (forthcominga: 9-14).  
2  And satisfying these evidential requirements are far from sufficient for legal recognition. To name one other 
barrier, there is also a “requirement for married applicants to obtain the consent of their spouse or end their 
marriage” (U.K. Gov’t: 11). 
3 It’s worth mentioning that something close to the central distinction of this thesis has been suggested by trans 
rights activist Cristan Williams (2013; 2018). My concept of ‘gender orientation,’ however, will turn out to be 
substantively different from hers in two ways: (i) I view an individual’s gender orientation as plastic (not fixed 
or rigid) and (ii) my account of gender orientation is compatible with a strong social constructionist view of 
gender (see §3.1).  
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 My argument proceeds as follows. In section two, I explain my approach as ameliorative. I 
distinguish my project from Jenkins’s recent ameliorative account of gender identity by criticizing her 
view for suffering from the diversity problem. Then I introduce the terms for the central distinction 
by drawing on analogous distinction between sexual identity/orientation. In section three, I isolate a 
general concept of gender orientation. Generally, a person’s gender orientation is grounded in their 
pre-reflective and plastic psychological relation to gendered social practices (§3.1). Since a person’s gender 
orientation underdetermines their gender identity (and vice versa), gender orientation is distinct from 
the target concept of gender identity (§3.2). In section four, I offer a new target concept of gender 
identity. First, I draw on Dembroff’s and Saint-Croix’s model of ‘agential identities’ to present an 
agential view of gender identity that prioritizes sincere self-ascription (§4.1). Then, I explain how the 
agential view grounds respect for gender identity in its psychological and political dimensions (§4.2). I 
conclude by reconsidering how the distinction between gender identity and gender orientation puts 
us in a better theoretical position to address the diversity and resource problems. 
2 TWO KINDS OF AMELIORATIVE PROJECTS 
I am operating within a framework of ‘ameliorative inquiry’ or ‘prescriptive conceptual analysis.’ 
Broadly speaking, an ameliorative inquiry into gender concepts is one that seeks to identify what our 
legitimate purposes are in categorizing people on the basis of gender, and to develop concepts that 
would help us achieve these ends (Haslanger 2012: 366). These kinds of conceptual analyses are 
important because, as Burgess and Plunkett put it, “our conceptual repertoire determines not only 
what we can think and say but also, as a result, what we can do and who we can be” (2013). 
 In my project, I will distinguish between two target concepts: gender identity and gender 
orientation. A distinction between these two concepts will prove to be helpful for political ends that 
combat trans-based oppression and resist dominant gender ideologies. 
4 
 Since one of the target concepts in question is the concept of gender identity, my project bears 
important similarities to Katharine Jenkins’s recent work on gender identity, which also adopts an 
ameliorative framework (2016; 2018). Like Jenkins, I am after (in part) a target concept of gender 
identity, and like her I am “taking the aims of the trans rights movement as [my] starting point” (2018: 
715-16). But I take myself to be pursuing a different kind of ameliorative project than Jenkins. As 
Robin Dembroff points out, an ameliorative inquiry could either: 
(1) Develop revised concepts for currently oppressive social categories, with an aim to revising 
the schemas underlying those categories, or  
(2) Analyze concepts already operating in non-dominant contexts that resist oppressive social 
categories, with an aim to revising the schemas underlying those categories.4 
Although I share the same political aims and motivations as Jenkins, my project differs from hers to 
the extent that hers is an example of (1) and mine will be an example of (2). But before giving the 
analysis of the new concept of gender identity, it will be worth demonstrating the limitations of 
Jenkins’s popular view. 
 Interestingly, Jenkins’s view cannot succeed as an instance of (2) because it suffers from the 
diversity problem: her view cannot account for the range of gender identities possible within trans-
inclusive contexts. Consider that some members of the LGBTQ+ community self-ascribe multiple 
different gender terms at once. For example, consider Riley J. Dennis’s self-identification as both a 
trans woman and as non-binary: 
For me, I feel like I’m far enough to the ‘girl’ side of the [gender] spectrum to consider myself 
a girl, but I also feel kinda gender neutral. I don’t feel like a binary trans woman, but I also 
don’t feel like the word ‘non-binary’ fully describes my experience (2016).  
 
 
4 See Dembroff’s “Oppressive Categories” (manuscript). A third, probably more familiar type of ameliorative 
project is Haslanger’s, which “focuses upon revealing categories as social (and oppressive), rather than natural” 
(Dembroff manuscript). 
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Riley isn’t alone in identifying as a non-binary woman either, as many other members of the LGBTQ+ 
community, including myself, identify as non-binary women too. A few other examples of publicly-
identifying non-binary or genderqueer women include: animator Rebecca Sugar, activist Laurie Penny, 
and journalist Suzanna Weiss, (Thorn 2019; Penny 2015; Weiss 2015).5 Each of these individuals offer 
different personal interpretations of what it means to self-ascribe these gender terms, but I assume 
that there is an important sense in which they share a common gender identity. The sense in which 
these individuals share a common gender identity is the target concept of gender identity I’m interested 
in, so I’ll now explain why Jenkins’s view cannot be an analysis of that target concept. 
 On Jenkins’s view, one’s gender identity is wholly determined by which set of gender-coded 
norms one experiences as relevant to oneself (2018: 728-36). So, she understands people with the 
gender identity ‘woman’ to be all and only those who experience female-coded norms as relevant to 
themselves (2016: 410). But she understands people with non-binary gender identities as all and only 
those who neither experience female-coded norms nor male-coded norms as relevant to themselves 
(2018: 735). So, on her view, the gender identities ‘non-binary’ and ‘woman’ name two mutually 
exclusive psychological phenomena, and these phenomena cannot occur at the same time in the same 
individual, ex hypothesi.  
The fact that some people identify as both non-binary and as men or women therefore presents 
a serious explanatory problem for Jenkins’s view, especially if Jenkins follows many trans and queer 
communities in taking gender identity to be sufficient for gender category membership. At best, 
Jenkins’s view can only explain how a non-binary woman is a member of one of those gender 
 
5 This identification may strike some readers as a conceptual impossibility, so it’s worth emphasizing that the 
conceptual gender schema in question is not the schema operative in dominant contexts. On the dominant 
schema, non-binary men/women are conceptual impossibilities. But I take such an impossibility to indicate a 
problem with the dominant conceptual schema, not the self-identification. It is a fundamental assumption of 
my project that trans and queer identifications should be respected. Consider that dismissing the explanations 
trans and queer people give of their own gender identities because they aren’t intelligible in accordance with 
dominant conceptual schemas is a serious epistemic injustice. 
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categories, but it cannot explain membership in both categories because ‘nonbinary’ and ‘woman’ 
name two incompatible psychological types.6 Jenkins’s view of gender identity is not sensitive enough 
to conceptions of gender identity operative in trans and queer contexts that resist oppressive gender 
categorizations, and so is not an instance of (2). What’s worse, if facts about gender category 
membership(s) are wholly determined by psychological features as Jenkins suggests, then it seems 
difficult to account for the agency that queer and trans people have over their own gender 
categorizations.7 If gender identity is sufficient for gender category membership, then the target 
concept of gender identity must better reflect the agency that queer and trans people have over their 
own gender categorizations, as well as the agency they have in interpreting their own psychology. 
 To arrive at such an account, I suggest that we provisionally distinguish the target concept of 
gender identity from its psychological connotations (e.g. ‘having an internal sense of oneself as 
woman’). To introduce the terms for such a distinction, I invite the reader to consider Dembroff’s 
contrast between sexual orientation and sexual identity: an individual’s sexual orientation is grounded 
in their dispositions to engage in certain sexual behaviors, while “sexual identity … refer[s] to an 
individual’s self-identification with respect to their sexual orientation … [so] is sensitive to the concept 
of sexual orientation” (2016: 6). I propose using ‘gender orientation’ to name the psychological 
concept of gender explored in the recent literature and reserving ‘gender identity’ for the new target 
concept. Below, I aim to make this contrast more salient by first offering a general view of gender 
orientation, followed by an agential account of gender identity.   
 
6  It’s worth mentioning that Jenkins’s view also generates an exclusion problem to the extent that she takes 
gender identity to be necessary for category membership. See Barnes (forthcoming: 6-8). 
7  For similar criticisms of Jenkins’s view, see Andler (2017) and especially Dembroff (forthcominga). Dembroff 
also uses the example of non-binary women to object Jenkins, but for a slightly different argumentative end 
than mine. Their end is narrower: they use the example to show that internalist approaches to genderqueer identities 
fail, but I take the example to show that these approaches fail as ameliorative accounts of gender identity more 
generally. Also, this example isn’t the only instance of the diversity problem, as the example of Sophie and 
Taylor in §3.2 below is another instance of the same problem.   
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3 ISOLATING A CONCEPT OF GENDER OREINTATION 
In this section, I outline a few conditions I take to be important for theorizing about psychological 
gender under the headings of ‘pre-reflectivity’ and ‘plasticity.’ The result is a view of gender orientation 
that encompasses and improves upon the recent accounts of psychological gender. 
3.1 Two Features of Gender Orientation: Pre-Reflectivity and Plasticity 
Generally, I propose understanding gender orientation as one’s psychological relation to social 
practices that (explicitly or implicitly) involve gender categories and properties.8 Following Ásta and 
Dembroff, I take the exact social categories and properties involved in a given social practice to 
depend largely on the broader social context in which that practice takes place (2018; 2019). The 
socially contextual nature of gender categories and properties means that they often intersect with 
other social categories and properties (e.g. race, ability, sexuality, class, etc.) in interesting and 
sometimes problematic ways (Ásta 2018). To give just one brief example, a gender property like 
‘feminine’ may not be regularly conferred onto a disabled woman whose body is routinely stigmatized 
as deficient in some way. Even if she participates in the same social practices (think of beauty practices) 
that able-bodied women participate in and to the same extent as they do, the property ‘feminine’ may 
not be conferred onto her in an ableist and sexist social context where ‘feminine’ is attempting to track 
reproductive viability. The reader should bear the intersectionality and context sensitivity of social 
properties in mind for my uses of ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ below, since these properties are not 
consistently operative within even the same social practices.  
Two central features of gender orientation I will focus on are its pre-reflectivity and plasticity. ‘Pre-
reflective’ describes how a person’s engagement in gendered social practices does not require that they 
 
8 I am relying here on Haslanger’s view of social practices as “patterns of learned behavior that enable us (in 
the primary instance) to coordinate as members of a group in creating, distributing, managing, maintaining, and 
eliminating a resource (or multiple resources), due to mutual responsiveness to each other’s behavior and the 
resource(s) in question, as interpreted through shared meanings/cultural schema” (2018). 
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explicitly consider their own category membership. And ‘plastic’ describes how a person’s 
psychological relation to gender categories shapes and is shaped by engagement in gendered social 
practices. I’ll now specify each of these features in turn: 
Pre-Reflectivity 
 
 One’s gender orientation is grounded in a set of sufficiently many, sufficiently strong 
(i) pre-reflective experiences of gender-norm relevancy, or 
(ii) dispositions to pre-reflectively behave in gender-coded ways.  
‘Pre-reflective’ captures how a person’s psychological relation to social practices involving 
gender categories/properties does not require that they represent themself or their own attitudes or 
conduct in accordance with the relevant categories/properties. To quote Haslanger, “agents are 
responsive to the world and each other in ways that are not always easily accessible to the agent or 
governed by intentions” (2018). So, for example, a trans woman might experience feminine-coded 
norms as relevant to herself before reflectively identifying as a woman (to others or even to herself). 
Having such experiences does not require that she represent either herself as a woman or the relevant 
norms as feminine. Although we can and do become reflectively aware of ourselves and our (possible) 
conduct as gendered in various ways, having a specific gender orientation is not a matter of such 
awareness. Pre-reflectivity is therefore important because it accounts for how we are responsive to 
gender categories and properties in ways that are not always easily accessible to us. 
I view ‘experiencing certain gender-norms as relevant to oneself’ and ‘having dispositions to 
behave in gender-coded ways’ as two possible ways of psychologically relating to social practices 
involving gender categories and properties. So, with (i) and (ii), I’ve encompassed Jenkins’s and 
McKitrick’s psychological accounts of gender under the ‘pre-reflectivity’ heading. An upshot of this 
is that a general view of gender orientation can remain somewhat neutral on whether having a specific 
gender orientation is a matter of having certain dispositions to behave in gender-coded ways, having 
9 
experiences of gender-norm relevancy, or a combination of the two. But to be clear, experiences of 
gender-norm relevancy and gender-coded dispositions are not exactly the same. These phenomena 
can and often do come apart. First, one could experience a gender norm as relevant without having a 
corresponding disposition to behave in accordance with that norm. To borrow an example from 
Jenkins, a woman could experience a norm like ‘women ought to shave their legs’ as relevant without 
following that norm (2018: 730-1). Second, one could have a disposition to behave in a gender-coded 
way without experiencing the norm calling for such behavior as relevant. For example, an agender 
person socialized as a man might have a disposition to use men’s restrooms without experiencing that 
norm as relevant to themself. 
Having a specific gender orientation (e.g. ‘trans-feminine,’ ‘masculine,’ ‘non-conforming,’ etc.) 
depends on a few things. For starters, it depends on how strong one’s dispositions and experiences of 
norm-relevancy are, as well as how many dispositions and experiences of norm-relevancy one has. I 
follow McKitrick in using, ‘sufficiently many, sufficiently strong’ to highlight that having a specific 
gender orientation is a matter of degree (2015: 2582). Further, since (i) and (ii) come apart, a person’s 
gender orientation needn’t be uniformly ‘feminine,’ ‘masculine,’ ‘agender,’ etc.9 For example, a bigender 
person, call them Zoe, might only have dispositions to behave in female-coded ways but strongly 
experience masculine norms as relevant. Although gender orientation is primarily pre-reflective, I take 
it that an agent reflectively has what Bettcher calls ‘first-person authority’ over which set of 
psychological phenomena are most relevant for describing their specific orientation (2009).10 So, 
 
9 I take these categories to be continuous even within the same mode of psychological relation. For example, a 
person could have a more or less feminine orientation just in virtue of having more or less, stronger or weaker, 
experiences of norms coded as ‘feminine’ within their social context. The continuity of categories associated 
with gender orientation is analogous to the likely continuity of categories associated with sexual orientation (see 
Dembroff 2016: 23). 
10 Like Bettcher, I take this sort of authority to be ethical rather than epistemic (2009: 99-103). Just as one could 
deceive oneself with respect to one’s sexual orientation, one could deceive oneself with respect to one’s gender 
orientation too. For example, a trans person who grew up in a conservative, transphobic social context might 
struggle for years with repressing their gender orientation. 
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whether Zoe’s orientation should be described as feminine, masculine, both, or non-conforming 
depends on which set of psychological phenomena Zoe themself prioritizes. 
A second feature of gender orientation is plasticity.11 This concept captures how one’s gender 
orientation shapes and is shaped by engagement in gendered social practices. Specifically, plasticity 
names two important phenomena: one's gender orientation is often behavior- and action-guiding, and 
it can change over time. So, I understand gender orientation to be plastic in that:  
Plasticity 
 
 One’s gender orientation 
(iii) shapes one’s possible conduct in social practices that implicitly or explicitly involve 
gender categories/properties, and  
(iv) is shaped by one’s engagement in those social practices and by the social resources 
made available through them.  
Condition (iii) describes how a person’s gender orientation can function to guide them through 
social and material realities involving gender categories/properties. The operation of these 
categories/properties can be either explicit (think of gender-specific restrooms), or implicit (think of 
how wearing makeup in some contexts is often coded as ‘feminine’). The ‘map’ metaphors offered by 
Jenkins and Ásta are instructive here for describing how one’s gender orientation is behavior- and 
action-guiding. On these views, a social agent has an internal or subjective ‘map’ that they use in order 
to navigate various gender norms.  For example, a feminine orientation may function like a ‘map’ that 
guides one through the social and material realities characteristic of women in one’s social context 
(Jenkins 2016: 410). Having a specific gender orientation, then, partly consists in “constraints on and 
enablements to one’s [gender-coded] behavior” (Ásta 2018: 112). 
 
11 This feature is loosely inspired by Catherine Malabou’s work on the concept of plasticity in What Should We 
Do with Our Brain? and Changing Difference (2008; 2011). 
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Condition (iv) helps account for how one’s gender orientation is formed by processes of 
socialization, but it also accounts for the possibility that an individual’s gender orientation may change 
in subtle or even drastic ways as a result of improvements in the interpretive or material resources 
made available through certain social practices. Based on my own lived-experience and conversations 
I’ve had with other trans people, it seems especially important that gender orientation is theorized as 
plastic in this receptive sense. Recognizing that our psychological relation to gender can genuinely 
change is important for resisting the dangerous expectation for all trans people to have and always 
have had a deep sense of ourselves as belonging to a gender category other than the one assigned at 
birth. For example, Theryn Meyers is a trans woman and activist who grew up in a religious, hyper-
conservative social context in South Africa. Consider her response to an interviewer’s question about 
when she knew she was trans: 
I think the very popular narrative is, ‘I always knew.’ But it’s usually not that simple because 
these things are quite complicated, and internal feelings of gender are very complicated and 
subjective but also influenced by an outside environment. I never thought too much of my 
gender when I was young, but then again, I didn’t have too much self-awareness when I was 
young. I was just frolicking around … 
 
[Transitioning] was a slow, gradual discovery of who I was. … I remember working a summer 
job … just to save up for facial feminization surgery. And I saved up for facial feminization 
surgery before I even realized I was a woman. I just knew that I didn’t like my face. It’s kind 
of interesting how non-linear these experiences can be (2019). 
 
As a trans woman who also grew up in a hyper-conservative social context, I would be surprised if 
these sorts of non-linear experiences were statistically rare for trans people raised in similar contexts. 
To quote trans video essayist Sarah Zedig, “some people just know that they’re trans, and others take 
years to realize that they’re even allowed to ask the question” (2018). For these reasons, it is important 
to recognize that our psychological relation to gendered social practices can change as the practices 
themselves change and as the operation of the gender categories within them change. 
To be clear, I don’t think the conditions described under the plasticity and pre-reflectivity 
headings are exhaustive of a target concept of gender orientation, as embodiment also likely affects 
12 
one’s psychological relation to gender categories.12 But I hope that conditions (i)-(iv) are a promising 
start for a target concept: 
Gender Orientation 
 
 One’s gender orientation is grounded in a set of sufficiently many, sufficiently strong 
(i) pre-reflective experiences of gender-norm relevancy, or 
(ii) dispositions to pre-reflectively behave in gender-coded ways; and 
(iii) shapes one’s possible conduct in social practices that implicitly or explicitly involve 
gender categories/properties, and  
(iv) is shaped by one’s engagement in those social practices and by the social resources 
made available through them.  
 
3.2 Gender Orientation ≠ Gender Identity 
Although I gave some reasons for thinking that gender identity is not just a psychological type in §2, 
it’s worth emphasizing this point again with a few more examples in light of the account above. Before 
considering more examples, it will be helpful to stipulate just one necessary condition that an 
ameliorative account of gender identity must meet. 
Assume that sincere gender self-ascriptions, for the most part, are veridical and reliable 
indicators of a person’s gender identity. This assumption is warranted by the ameliorative framework 
I’ve adopted, since it is modeled on assumptions made in queer and trans-inclusive contexts. For 
example, if I am mistaken for a drag queen in a queer space, my correction that ‘I’m a trans woman’ 
immediately has authority over the fact that I overextended my cut-crease. To quote Bettcher, in trans 
and queer contexts, “self-identifications are generally accepted at face value” (2009: 108). 
 
12 For instance, see Williams’s discussion of an internal “experience of one’s … sexed attributes” (2013; 2018). 
It’s worth mentioning that Williams uses the term ‘gender orientation’ to describe only sexed embodiment (not 
norms or dispositions), and that her description of sexed embodiment as “fixed” contradicts the plasticity of 
gender orientation. Pace Williams, the internal psychological relation a person has with respect to their sexed 
characteristics (and the gender-codedness of some of those characteristics) can change, and it’s important to 
account for this kind of plasticity because many trans people describe it as a valuable part of transitioning (see 
Zedig 2018). 
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This substantive assumption is captured by Barnes’s formulation of permissivism about 
gender terms, and by one of Jenkins’s desiderata for an account of gender identity. To quote Barnes, 
“[when] a person says ‘I am x’ for some gender term, we should interpret the term ‘x’ in a way that 
makes the speaker’s claim true” (forthcoming: 18).  To quote Jenkins, the target concept of gender 
identity should make it plausible that “a person should be treated as the final and decisive authority 
on their own gender identity” (2018: 719).13 In light of Barnes’s permissivism and Jenkins’s 
desideratum, we can see that gender orientation and gender identity come apart in at least two ways. 
First, it is possible for two people to have the same gender orientation and have different 
gender identities. For example, it’s plausible that an early transition trans man and a trans-masculine 
non-binary person could have the same gender orientation while having different gender identities: 
one identifies as a man, and the other doesn’t. This possibility isn’t unique to transgender identities 
either, as sameness in orientation might occur across cis and transgender identities. For example, a 
hardcore feminist who identifies as a woman, call her Sophie, might have virtually the same 
psychological relation to feminine-coded norms as a genderqueer identifying feminist, call them 
Taylor. Both Sophie and Taylor may pre-reflectively experience norms characteristic of women in 
their social context as alienating and irrelevant to themselves, so they may even share the same set of 
gender non-conforming dispositions. Still, despite sharing a non-conforming orientation, I take it that 
Sophie and Taylor would have different gender identities if they each self-ascribed different gender 
categories, and that we shouldn’t assume that either Sophie or Taylor must be wrong or mistaken in 
their respective gender self-ascriptions. 
 A second reason to think that gender orientation is distinct from gender identity is that two 
people could have the same gender identity but different orientations. A group of non-binary people 
 
13 Jenkins’s own view, however, doesn’t seem well-suited to satisfy this desideratum in light of the diversity 
problem. Consider that her norm-relevancy account does give prima facie reasons for discounting at least one 
of the gender categories self-ascribed by non-binary women: they are conceptually impossible. 
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could have a range of different gender orientations (feminine, non-conforming, agender, bigender, 
gender fluid, etc.) but still have a common gender identity. I am skeptical that people with non-binary 
identities have (or need to have) a common underlying gender orientation. On this point, I follow 
Dembroff’’s suggestion that an analysis of the category ‘genderqueer’ should “leave space for variation 
across … the mental states accompanying felt or desired categorization outside of the binary” 
(forthcominga).  Again, this phenomenon probably isn’t unique to transgender identities, as it is likely 
true for identities like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ too. 
 This conceptual gap between gender orientation and gender identity has important 
implications for the recent psychological accounts of gender identity, as it shows that these accounts 
are inadequate in one crucial respect. Because the recent accounts try to unify discreet gender identities 
via some common underlying psychological types, these accounts risk getting the extension wrong for 
specific gender identities. Further, if having a specific gender identity is sufficient for membership in 
a specific gender category, then psychological accounts of gender identity risk getting category 
membership facts wrong too. Since the target concept of gender identity cannot be understood solely 
in terms of gender orientation, I turn now to an analysis of gender identity that is more likely to get 
extension and membership facts right while respecting the agency that trans and queer people have 
over their own gender categorizations.  
4 AN AGENTIAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER IDENTITY 
In this section, I first present an account of gender identity loosely modeled on Dembroff’s and Saint-
Croix’s view of ‘agential social identities’ (forthcoming). On this view, gender identity is understood 
in terms of an agent’s sincere gender self-ascriptions that have a special feature called position-directed 
externality: allowing or accepting that others take you as a member of your self-ascribed gender category 
as a result of externalizing that self-ascription to them. Then, I explain how an agential view of gender 
identity grounds respect for gender identity in its psychological and political dimensions.  
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4.1 Prioritizing Sincere Self-Ascription 
So far, I’ve taken for granted some assumptions that operate in queer and trans contexts. 
Specifically, I assumed that self-ascribing a gender category is typically sufficient for having a gender 
identity of the self-ascribed category, and that such self-ascriptions are sufficient for category 
membership. At this point, one may wonder whether self-ascription is just what it is for a person to 
have a specific gender identity. Is the target concept of gender identity just an account of self-ascribed 
gender categories? 
 On this question, Jenkins is instructive. As she points out, an account of gender identity which 
“equates gender identity with self-[ascription] … fares very poorly at showing that gender identity is 
important and deserves respect … why should we care about dispositions to utter certain sentences?” 
(2018: 727-8). If all it takes to have a certain gender identity is to say so, and if having said gender 
identity is sufficient for membership in said gender category, then both one’s gender identity and one’s 
gender category membership(s) seem vacuous or trivial. I think this challenge to a self-ascription 
model of gender identity can be met with an agential analysis of gender identity, so I turn to developing 
such a view now.  
 Following Dembroff and Saint-Croix, I understand an ‘agential identity’ to be a kind of social 
identity that forms a bridge between who we take ourselves to be and how others take us to be 
(forthcoming). The central feature of agential identities that I am interested in here is how these 
identities often help agents revise or situate themselves within certain social positions (forthcoming). 
I think we can understand the concept of gender identity as it operates in queer contexts in this way, 
and when we do, we end up with an analysis that appropriately prioritizes self-ascription over 
psychology: 
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Agential Gender Identity 
 
S has a gender identity g just in case S self-ascribes or is disposed to self-ascribe a 
gender category where 
(i) (sincerity) S’s self-ascription is sincere,  
(ii) (externality) S’s self-ascription is made available to others in some relevant social 
context(s), and  
(iii) (position-directedness) S allows, or at least accepts, that others take S as occupying a 
group-associated social position as a result of fulfilling (ii).14  
I now explicate (i)-(iii) in turn. 
 First, the gender self-ascription one makes must be sincere. This is important because it 
discounts ironic or malicious self-ascriptions, as well as false or coerced self-ascriptions offered in 
contexts where sincerely self-ascribing one’s gender category would be dangerous or risky. To take 
the latter example, a closeted trans man in a transphobic context might self-ascribe as a ‘woman’ 
around her family because sincerely self-ascribing as a man would be dangerous. I take the primary 
advantage of the sincerity condition to be that it explains why coerced self-ascriptions can be 
discounted, and I take the possibility of discounting ironic self-ascriptions to be secondary.15 
Second, it is important that an agent at least be disposed to offer their self-ascription to others. 
To be clear, a person’s self-ascribed gender categorization(s) needn’t be operative in their immediate 
social context, just in some relevant (possible or actual) context. Notice that externality doesn’t require 
that a person’s gender identity is made publicly available or even that they have a personal relationship 
to whomever they offer their self-ascription. (e.g. entering ‘non-binary’ on an online form satisfies the 
 
14 Conditions (ii) and (iii) are slightly modified from Dembroff’s and Saint-Croix’s discussion of ‘position-
directed externality’ (forthcoming).   
15 Further, there is no special epistemic problem of how to tell when gender self-ascriptions are sincere as opposed 
to any other utterance. Skyler Jay trying to change his legal gender marker at a Georgia DMV is a sincere gender 
self-ascription that should be respected, and Steven Crowder pretending to be a trans woman at a women’s 
march in order to mock trans rights activists is a malicious gender self-ascription that can be discounted if 
needed. 
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externality condition). To clarify further, the externality condition doesn’t require that a trans person 
is ‘out’ in any actual social context either. This is because the view requires that one be disposed to self-
ascribe in a relevant social context.16 So, if a closeted genderqueer person only has a disposition to make 
their self-ascription available to others in a queer context but not in a dominant one, then they still 
satisfy the externality condition, even if they haven’t yet manifested that disposition in the relevant 
(i.e., queer) context.17 18 
 Finally, in offering a self-ascription of a gender category, and agent must allow or accept that 
others take them as occupying a social position associated with the group corresponding to that 
category. This condition is ‘what makes agential identities agential’ because it captures the agency we 
have over our own social positions and social categorizations (forthcoming: 579). This feature is also 
what overcomes Jenkins’s reductio: allowing that others treat you as a woman as a result of your saying 
so is far from vacuous or trivial. Saying ‘I’m a woman’ may be trivial in the sense that even a man 
could do it, but saying so and meaning it is a different story. 
There are three crucial points of clarification here. First, as Dembroff and Saint-Croix point 
out, position-directedness doesn’t require that one self-ascribe under the guise of occupying a specific 
social position (forthcoming: 580). So, for example, if a trans woman has the gender identity of a 
 
16 These qualifications entail that membership in a gender category does not require that an agent incur significant 
social costs. But it might still be the case that some gender categories constitutively involve significant social costs. 
For example, Dembroff argues that ‘critical gender kinds’ cannot be adequately understood without reference 
to some significant social costs that an agent may incur as a result of resisting dominant gender ideology 
(forthcominga). But Dembroff is clear that they do not take one’s membership in a critical gender category to 
require that one incurs significant social costs. Membership conditions in a social category and the constitutive 
conditions of that category come apart. The category Red Sox fan cannot be adequately understood without 
reference to public displays of enthusiasm for the Red Sox and antagonism towards the Yankees, but one can 
still privately be a Red Sox fan without hating the Yankees. 
17 The externality condition might make my account of gender identity too strong to always secure category 
membership for trans children. But I don’t think we should take gender identity to be necessary for category 
membership in the first place, as plenty of other things (e.g. social position or gender orientation) can explain 
why a person is or ought to be considered a member of the relevant gender category (see Dembroff 
forthcomingb ; Haslanger 2012: 221-47). 
18 But if such a person didn’t manifest their disposition to self-ascribe that category were they to enter a queer 
context, they would likely be violating a duty of self-realization that they have to themself. 
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‘woman,’ the agential view doesn’t require that in self-ascribing that category she has also formed an 
intention to occupy the social position of a woman. Second, since “multiple social positions often are 
associated with a single social group”, position-directedness does not require that an agent allow that 
others take them as occupying a specific social position (575). So, on the agential view, a person self-
ascribing as a woman doesn’t require that she accept or allow that others treat her as socially 
subordinate, even if a social position associated with the group ‘women’ is in fact subordinate in her 
social context. Also, because one could self-ascribe different gender categories associated with 
different groups across different contexts, a person’s gender identity needn’t be limited to just one 
gender term but could be accurately captured by multiple different terms at once (e.g. non-binary 
women). Third, position-directedness doesn’t require that one’s self-ascription have social uptake 
(forthcoming: 576). So, if a trans woman does come out but is told that she’s delusional or is ignored, 
then she is still a woman regardless of her actual social position. 
 Now, I’m not suggesting that this agential analysis of gender identity is the only important 
sense of gender identity used in trans-inclusive context. But I do think that it is the most ameliorative 
concept of gender identity operative in these contexts because it resists the conceptual schemas 
underlying transgender oppression that operate in dominant contexts. I will develop this point soon 
(§5), but before doing so, it’s worth asking why self-ascribed gender categories with position directed 
externality warrant respect/social uptake. How does the agential analysis meet Jenkins’s challenge? 
4.2 Psychological and Political Dimensions of Agential Gender Identity 
Here, I develop two further features of agential gender identity that ground respect for gender 
self-ascriptions: its psychological and political dimensions. These dimensions often overlap, but I’ll 
analyze them separately.  
 Most of the time when we offer gender self-ascriptions to others, we’re communicating 
something important about ourselves. Gender self-ascriptions are commonly understood as attempts 
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to communicate some internal ‘sense’ of oneself as belonging to a certain gender category. I think this 
deeply personal sense of gender identity can be captured in the following way: 
Psychological Dimension: S’s gender identity g has a psychological dimension just 
in case S’s self-ascribed gender category is predicated upon S’s gender orientation. 
Just as a person’s sexual identity (e.g. lesbian) is sensitive to their sexual orientation (e.g. homosexual), 
a person’s gender identity (e.g. genderqueer), is often (but not necessarily) sensitive to their gender 
orientation (e.g. non-conforming).19 The psychological dimension of agential gender identity thus 
captures how gender self-ascriptions are often made on the basis of important psychological 
phenomena, or even a deep existential sense of oneself as belonging to a certain gender category or 
social group.20 Respecting gender identities when they have this psychological dimension is crucial for 
well-being and mental-health, especially for transgender groups. Empirically speaking, studies show 
that well-being and mental health for trans people heavily depends on our agential identities having 
social uptake (see Bailey, Ellis, and McNeil 2014; Toomey, Syvertsen, and Shramko 2018). And 
philosophically speaking, a person’s dignity or self-respect can be undermined when their social 
identity lacks uptake, especially in cases where coming-out is met with hate speech.21 Since the agential 
view of gender identity is sensitive to psychological and selfhood-related phenomena often underlying 
gender self-ascriptions, it grounds respect for gender self-ascriptions when they have this 
psychological dimension.  
 
19 Following Andler’s discussion of labels used for describing sexuality, notice that sometimes the same label is 
used to describe both an orientation and an identity (e.g. ‘bisexual’), and sometimes different labels are used for 
each (e.g. ‘lesbian’ describes a sexual identity while ‘homosexual’ describes a sexual orientation) (forthcoming: 
1-2). There might be a similar phenomenon with respect to labels used for describing gender: terms like 
‘agender’ or ‘bigender’ can describe both an identity and an orientation, while ‘non-conforming’ might more 
commonly describe a gender orientation and ‘genderqueer’ a gender identity. 
20 See Dembroff and Saint-Croix’s notion of kinship: “seeing oneself as relevantly similar to other members of 
[a] group, where one takes this similarity to mean that one does (or should) have properties that are sufficient 
for group membership” (forthcoming). 
21 See Seglow (2016) and Waldron (2012: 105-143) for the relation between dignity, self-respect, and hate 
speech. 
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 The psychological dimension of gender identity is an important locus of respect, but I do not 
think it is the only one. In fact, it is hermeneutically dangerous to assume that respecting someone’s 
gender identity requires that their self-ascription is predicated on their gender orientation. Consider 
the following testimony from Natalie Wynn, a trans woman who transitioned publicly on YouTube: 
In my mid-20s I first really started paying attention to trans women and thinking about 
transitioning myself. But I thought that since I didn’t “feel like a woman” that I never would, 
and I thought that I would never pass and that I would just be a hideous parody of 
womanhood (2018).  
 
I’m surprised by how much HRT and full-time transing [sic] have improved my life. Till then 
I wasn't 100% sure I was trans. But any shadow of a doubt is now gone. Knowing how this 
feels I can never go back (2017).22 
 
Based on Wynn’s testimony, it’s plausible that her decision to transition was delayed by the worry that 
her gender identity wouldn’t be respected in the absence of a psychological dimension that she could 
make clearly intelligible to others. Cases like Wynn’s seem to show that it is even important to respect 
gender identities that aren’t predicated upon gender orientation. 
 Rather than respecting gender self-ascriptions solely on the basis of what they might 
communicate about a person, we can respect them on the basis of what they do. To quote Dembroff:  
If gender becomes based on self-identification, [conservatives] worry, the social systems that 
smoothly determine social expectations … and gender-based labor divisions will become 
muddied and inefficient.
 
Here, to my mind, one man’s modus tollens is one queer’s modus 
ponens (2019: 16). 
 
What’s so disruptive about agential gender identities? How could we fill this out a little further? I 
propose the following view, drawing further on Dembroff’s work on oppressive social categories: 
Political Dimension: S’s gender identity g is political if S’s self-ascribing g calls for 
revising the grounding profile of an oppressive gender category operative within S’s 
social context.  
 
22 Again, based on my own personal experience and discussions I’ve had with other trans people, I would be 
surprised if this kind of ‘post-HRT clarity’ is statistically rare. 
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I maintain that just as the psychological dimension of gender identity is a sufficient locus of respect, 
so is the political dimension. Let me explain.  
 According to Dembroff, an oppressive category is one with either an unjust grounding or an 
unjust social profile (manuscript). The grounding profile of a category determines category 
membership, and the social profile determines the social position of category members (manuscript). 
For our purposes, what’s important is the grounding profile: the aspect that determines category 
membership, specifically membership in gender categories. I propose that for a gender identity to have 
a political dimension, it only needs to call for revising the grounding profile of an oppressive gender 
category. In other words, gender identities are politically laudable when they resist unjust conditions 
for membership within relevant gender categories. 
 Like position-directedness, this political dimension does not require that an agent offer a self-
ascription under the guise of revising an oppressive gender category. So, a person’s gender identity could 
have this political dimension even if their mental states don’t include anything about unjust 
membership conditions. All that matters is that their self-ascription calls for revising the unjust 
grounding profile of a gender category operative within their social context. To take an example, 
consider Kai Shappley, and 8-year old trans girl living in a conservative Texas town (Them 2018). 
Because of a bathroom bill recently passed, her teachers at school do not let her use the girl’s restroom, 
and Shappley frequently has accidents as a result: “other girls get to use the girl’s bathroom, and I 
don’t get to; and I’m a girl, so I should get to go to the girl’s bathroom” (Them 2018). In saying, “I’m 
a girl” in her social context, her self-ascription calls for revising the grounding profile of the category 
‘girl’ as it operates in that context. And since the grounding profile of the category, ‘girl,’ is unjust 
within her social context, her self-ascription has a political dimension. I maintain that even if it were 
unclear that Kai’s gender identity had a psychological dimension, her gender identity should still be 
respected in virtue of its political dimension. 
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  To be clear, I don’t take the psychological and political dimensions to be exhaustive of all 
possible loci of respect for gender identity. But I do take them to ground respect in a wide range of 
important cases. 
5 THE DIVERSITY AND RESOURCE PROBLEMS RECONSIDERED 
It is now time consider how the gender orientation/identity distinction helps with the diversity 
and resource problems. 
5.1 The Diversity Problem Reconsidered 
 I hope to have demonstrated how the distinction is helpful with respect to the diversity 
problem throughout the earlier sections, but it’s worth emphasizing the following three points. 
 First, the agential analysis of gender identity accounts for a person using multiple gender terms 
at once to describe their gender identity (e.g. non-binary man). Since a person can self-ascribe multiple 
gender categories at once, the diverse range of possible gender identities is accounted for (provided 
that the agent self-ascribing multiple categories accepts that others regard them as a member of those 
categories). Further, since a person can allow or accept that others take them as a member of multiple 
social groups at once (as a result of self-ascribing certain labels), composite gender identities like 
‘genderqueer woman’ are perfectly intelligible gender identities. But crucially, it’s up to the social agent 
which group-memberships count towards their gender identities because it’s up to the agent whether 
they accept that others take them as a member of the self-ascribed category. 
 A second way that the identity/orientation distinction helps with the diversity problem is that 
it captures more diverse uses of gender terms. Although these terms are always in flux, we might be 
able to notice, for example, that terms like ‘gender non-conforming,’ ‘trans-feminine,’ and ‘trans-
masculine’ are more frequently used to describe gender orientations, while terms like ‘genderqueer,’ 
‘trans woman,’ and ‘trans man’ are more commonly used to name agents’ acceptances of their social 
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positions. Although gender terms are plastic, we might be able to notice interesting trends in light of 
the ordination/identity distinction.  
 Lastly, the conceptual gap between gender identity and gender orientation helps us see how 
they come apart with respect to individuals too. A woman can have a non-conforming orientation. A 
man can have a hyper-feminine orientation. A genderqueer can have a masculine orientation. Further, 
a person’s gender orientation needn’t even be uniformly ‘non-conforming,’ ‘feminine,’ ‘masculine,’ et 
cetera. An agent’s relation to gender-norms, their gender-coded behaviors, social practices in which 
gender categories operate, and the social position the agent wants or needs to occupy is a quite 
complicated relation. And recognizing this complexity helps us resist the problematic assumption that 
a person ought to bring their gender identity ‘in line with’ a ‘corresponding’ gender orientation. These 
sorts of assumptions often lead to pathological or otherwise cisnormative understandings of 
transgender identities, but these cisnormative assumptions are undermined by the conceptual gap 
between gender orientation and gender identity. To explain the practical importance of this theoretical 
gap, I’ll now discuss the implications of the orientation/identity distinction for the resource problem. 
5.2 The Resource Problem Reconsidered: Legal Recognition and the GRA 
 Often, trans groups lack meaningful access to important social resources. To take just one 
example, I’ll focus on the social resource of legal recognition in the U.K., by using the example of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004. The GRA is the legislation that allows transgender people in the U.K. 
to change their legal gender marker. As discussed in a recent public consultation, the GRA is 
problematic in (at least) two ways: (i) it requires that a trans citizens satisfy three evidential requirements 
in order for the state to recognize their gender identity, and (ii) the GRA does not recognize non-
binary identities at all (U.K. Gov’t 2018: 51-3). It’s worth explaining each of these problems in some 
detail before analyzing them in light of the orientation/identity distinction.  
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There are three requirements considered ‘evidential’ by the U.K. Gov’t that trans citizens must 
satisfy to have their gender identity legally recognized. First, applicants must provide two medical 
reports “evidencing gender dysphoria and/or treatment” (U.K. Gov’t 2018: 30). The first report must 
be a diagnosis of gender dysphoria by a registered psychologist or doctor who specializes in gender 
dysphoria (2018: 30). The second report must describe “any treatment that the applicant has 
undergone or is planned for the purpose of modifying their sex characteristics” (2018: 30). Second, 
applicants must “collect documentation that proves the trans person has been living for at least two 
years in their acquired gender” (2018: 30). Some examples of qualifying documents include driver’s 
licenses, passports, letters from banks, utility bills, and academic certificates (2018: 31). This evidence, 
both the medical diagnosis and documentation, is then sent to panel, whom the applicant never meets, 
who decide whether legal recognition will be granted. Third, applicants must “provide a statutory 
declaration of [their] intention to live in their acquired gender until death” (2018: 30). This requirement 
is meant to “reflect the important legal consequences of gender recognition” and function “as a 
safeguard if the system is abused” (2018: 33-34).  Finally, there are no provisions for legal recognition 
of non-binary genders. And in the consultation, the state made it clear that at this time they “do not 
bring forward any proposals to extend the GRA to provide legal recognition to a third, or non-binary, 
gender” (2018: 52). 
 In light of the orientation/identity distinction, we can recognize the current state of the GRA 
as unjust in the following four ways:    
1.            Generally, we assume that whether we should treat someone as a member of a certain 
social category depends on whether they are actually members of that category.23 In light of this 
assumption, the earlier sections help us see that the medical diagnosis requirement is misguided 
because it actually fails to respect this assumption. Gender orientation is not always sufficient 
 
23 For arguments against this assumption, see Dembroff (manuscript; 2019).  
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for gender category membership, so facts about membership aren’t always grounded by 
psychological features relating to gender (e.g. gender dysphoria). To be clear, the reason that 
gender orientation is not always sufficient for category membership is because there is a conceptual 
gap between the two concepts (e.g., a woman can proudly have a non-conforming orientation and 
still be a woman). Agential gender identity, on the other hand, is sufficient for gender category 
membership in trans-inclusive contexts. And since we can ameliorate injustices in dominant 
contexts by implementing concepts used in non-dominant ones, we ought to take agential 
gender identity as sufficient for category membership in dominant progressive contexts as well 
as trans-inclusive ones. So, assuming that facts about treatment turn on facts about 
membership, we should look to a person’s agential gender identity — their accepting that a 
person take them as a member of the gender category they’ve self-ascribed — to determine 
whether they ought to be treated as a member of that category. In the present case, treating, 
say, a trans woman as a woman includes legally recognizing her as one.  
Further, the medical diagnosis requirement is unjust to the extent that it requires trans 
citizens’ gender identities to have a psychological dimension at all (in order for their gender 
identity to be legally recognized). One reason this situation is unjust is because cisgender 
citizens don’t have to prove any such psychological dimensions in order to access the same 
social resource. But the problem isn’t just that it’s unfair to require transgender citizens to 
submit medical or psychological evidence to the state when cis citizens don’t have to meet this 
requirement — although it is. The problem is also that these citizens must prove that their 
gender identity is predicated upon a specific gender orientation: one that is intelligible in accordance 
with the dominant cisnormative schema. Consider that in the U.K., gender dysphoria is described by 
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the NHS as a “mismatch between a person’s gender identity and their biological sex” (2019).24 
The state’s requiring trans applicants to satisfy this description problematically assumes that a 
person’s gender orientation ought to correspond with their agential gender identity and social 
position. The relevant aspect of gender orientation here is a person’s experiencing and 
following25 gender-norms like ‘women ought to have vaginas’ and ‘men ought to have penises.’ 
Not all trans people experience such norms as relevant, but this has no bearing on questions about 
actual category membership because those facts aren’t determined wholly by dominant conceptual schemas. A 
trans-inclusive concept of agential gender identity, not a cis-normative concept of gender 
orientation, is the concept we should turn to in order to settle questions about category 
membership.26 
2.  An agential understanding of gender identity shows the state that requiring evidence 
of certain dispositions (here, the disposition to identify oneself to the state as ‘male' or ‘female’) 
is misguided. It’s often unclear what legitimate purposes the state has in categorizing a person’s 
gender at all. So, the contexts in which trans people offer gender-self ascriptions in the 
qualifying government documents may not count as relevant contexts. So, the externality 
condition may not be met with the qualifying documents, even if the gender self-ascription is 
sincere. Further, there are other institutional barriers worth considering that make meeting the 
documentation requirement difficult. Consider that getting one’s gender marker changed on 
 
24 Recall the second report requiring that applicants detail “medical treatment that [they have] undergone or is 
planned for the purpose of modifying their sex characteristics” (2018: 30). 
25 This understanding of gender dysphoria is present in the U.S. too: consider the APA’s use of the phrase “the 
other gender” in its diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria: “[gender dysphoria is exemplified by] a strong desire 
for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other gender ” (2016). 
26 To give just one example of a trans-normative experience of bodily gender-norms, consider Buck Angel’s, a 
trans man, interpretation of his sexed body: “I don’t have to have a penis. I don’t have to have it. I don’t have 
to have it to be a man. It’s not necessary. It’s a misconception completely” (2014). Angel’s trans-normative 
experience of his body in no way undermines his membership in the category ‘man.’ See Andler using this same 
example to criticize Jenkins’s definition of gender identity (2017: 889-90). 
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one’s passport in the U.K. requires either: a gender recognition certificate (the certificate 
awarded after successfully getting through the process described in the GRA), a new birth 
certificate showing your correct gender (again, this is also awarded after going through the 
process described in the GRA), or a letter from your doctor “confirming that your change of 
gender will likely be permanent” (U.K. Gov’t 2020). This example shows that many trans 
citizens are expected to bootstrap their way into a new social position, and this is especially 
bad in light of the agential analysis of gender identity: the state’s barriers to the social resources 
instrumental for changing one's gender-associated social position systematically discriminate 
against having a transgender identity in the agential sense.  
3.  The requirement for trans citizens to declare that they intend to live as their declared 
gender until death ignores one of the central features of gender orientation: plasticity. 
Although gender identities needn’t have a psychological dimension, they often do. When 
gender identities do have this dimension, they are sensitive to various psychological features: 
psychological features which are themselves plastic and so subject to change. Although a 
person’s gender orientation is usually stable throughout their life, we should not expect of that a 
person’s psychological relation to gendered social practices will not or cannot change. Given that gender 
identities are often predicated upon gender orientations, we cannot rule out the possibility of 
a person’s gender identity changing too. So, since requiring trans people to declare that they 
intend to live as their self-ascribed gender until death ignores the complex and plastic relation 
that individuals have to gendered social structures, this requirement is should also be 
abandoned.  
4.  Finally, the government’s failure to extend any legal provisions to genderqueer people 
discriminates against having a genderqueer identity in the agential sense. Again, if we want our 
social categorization practices to track facts about membership, then the state should legally 
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recognize an already extant gender category.27 The state not offering legal recognition to 
genderqueer groups deprives many genderqueers of a valuable social resource that most 
citizens have automatically, and that is unjust. 
 
One way to revise the problematic conceptual schemas reflected in policies like the GRA is to reform 
those policies themselves. As trans rights groups like Stonewall U.K. are already advocating, the GRA 
could be reformed to recognize gender identities with a more streamlined model of self-declaration 
(2019). This model would not require presenting evidence of one’s gender orientation to the state, and 
it would extend legal recognition to non-binary gender identities (2019). Such a reform would amount 
to replacing a psychological, orientation-based concept of gender identity with the agential concept 
that is already operative in queer contexts. Hopefully, such a replacement would be effective for 
combating the conceptual schemas underlying transgender oppression more broadly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 There are various knock-on effects of such a move that might be beneficial too. Genderqueer identities could 
be treated more seriously and with more respect, visibility of the genderqueer population may be improved, 
and dominant modes of gender categorization might be disrupted too. 
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